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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * * * * *
ELVA ROMRELL,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

No. 16211

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
N.A., and ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL:
BANK OF OGDEN,
Defendants and
Appellants.

* * * * * * • * * * • *
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

* * * * * * * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for specific performance of an oral
contract to sell plaintiff a dairy farm comprised of 160
acres of real property in Weber County, Utah, or, in the
alternative, for compensatory damages for fraud.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following the court's denial of defendants' motion for
a directed verdict and the presentation of the defense, the
:ury unanimously returned a general verdict finding the
:ssues 1n favor of the plaintiff on her claim for specific
~erfarmance.

·. c~

Plaintiff's alternative claim for damages

c:Cereby rendered moot. The trial court entered judgment thereon,
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directinq the defendants to convey the real property in question to the plaintiff.

The trial court subsequently denied

defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or, in the alternative, for a new trial, whereupon defendants
appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks the court to affirm the aforesaid judgQent
on the verdict entered by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Statement of Facts presents an oversinplified
version of the evidence largely favorable to the appellants'
2osition at trial.

Respondent therefore submits this Counter-

statement of Facts in order to present the evidence in its
perspective on appeal.

~roper

See e.g., llhyte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d

1289 (Utah 1976).

Elva Romrell first became interested in purchasing the
real property involved herein during the latter part of March,
1975, when her brother, Lawrence Muirbrook,

infor~ed

her that

Zions Bank was foreclosing on 450 acres of real estate owned by
himself, Robert Muirbrook, and Nuirbrook Farns, Inc.

(R. 237-39.'·

The Muirbrooks had acknowledged the default and surrendered
possession of certain dairy equi[)ment and other personal
to Zions on or about March 19, 1975.

(R.

pro['er~.

416-19).

Mrs. Romrell was ?articular!; concerned about t~e ~enJ1n°
foreclosure sale, s1nce the

~arm ~as

t~e

place of ner birtn
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an~

had been in the Muirbrook family for years.

(R. 233-36).

Although she was not directly asked to become involved, she
made the decision to approach the bank about correcting the
default or purchasing the property for herself.

(R. 239, 243).

For some years preceding the foreclosure sale, the Muirbrook family had maintained a dairy operation on approximately
160 acres of their 450-acre farm in Weber County.

(R. 234).

The dairy operation necessitated the use of many items of processing equipment and other personal property located on the 160
acres of the real property.

(R. 265-66).

From the very begin-

ning, Respondent desired to purchase the 160 acres of real
property and the dairy equipment as a unit for the simple reason
that no one could continue to operate the dairy without owning
both the real and personal components thereof.

(Id.)

The

dairy equipment was of no value to Hrs. Romrell without the
real estate, since it was an integral part of the total operation.
(R. 319; 323).
Having made her decision to attempt either to purchase the
?roperty or bring the loan current, Respondent first contacted
Mr. Noall Bennett at Zions Bank in Salt Lake City on April 10,
1975.

(R. 239-41).

Mr. Bennett gave Plaintiff a copy of the

bank's appraisal of the property, explained the procedures
1nvolved in a foreclosure sale, and told her that it was too
late to cure the default.
~ncouraged

(R. 243; 316-17).

Plaintiff was

to become involved as a potential buyer at the

:or"closure sale.

(R. 243-44; 249).

At the conclusion of
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the meeting, Mr. Bennett made an appointment for Mrs, Romrell
to meet the next day with Angus Belliston who was responsible

tor the foreclosure proceedings.

(R. 249).

Mrs. Romrell returned to Zions Bank in Salt Lake City the
next day and was introduced to Angus Belliston.

(R. 250).

She

expressed her interest in acquiring the old family homestead
and was told that the bank would be pleased if she would enter
the picture.

(R. 252, 332).

Mr. Belliston informed her that

the bank had a prior agreement with Mr. Floyd Brown of Dairy
Capital Corporation to allow the latter to purchase the property.
(R. 250-51; 332).

Dairy Capital Corporation had entered into

an agreement with Zions on March 19, 1975, to lease and operate
the dairy if Zions took peaceful possession of same.
Ex. 2 at para. ll.

(Plf's.

The March 19th agreement also contained

the terms of purchase of the real and personal property.
Ex. 2 at para. 5, 8, 9).

(Plf's.

Mr. Belliston explained the details

of the Brown purchase agreement and gave Respondent a copj
thereof.

(R. 252-53; 332).

He further stated that he would

contact Floyd Brown to determine whether he would be willing
to allow Mrs. Romrell to purchase the property and in turn
lease the dairy from her.

(R. 252-53).

Mrs. Romrell again met with Angus Belliston at Zions Bank
in Salt Lake City on May 2, 1975.

(R. 253).

At this meeting !>II·

Belliston informeu Respondent that he had talked to Floyd

Bro~n

who had agreed to the change and that Zions was wllling to sel.
the dairy farm and equipment to Respondent for 5190,000.00, 1f
she would agree to lease t:1e dalr:; ;:o

~\r.

Brm'n.

(F.

255,
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33°

Plaintiff agreed to this arrangement, since if she acquired
the property she would need someone to operate the dairy.

(~)

The parties also discussed how Respondent proposed to
finance the purchase.

(R. 255).

Mr. Belliston informed her

that Zions would be willing to finance the purchase if she
would put up certain real property in Utah County as security.
(R. 255-56).

Mrs. Romrell accepted this as a commitment to

sell her the property on the same terms offered to Floyd Brown
and decided to discuss financing with her banker, Orville
Gunther, at the Bank of American Fork.

(R. 253, 255-56).

During the month of June, 1975, Mrs. Romrell devoted her
efforts to arranging financing for her intended purchase.
(R. 256-59).

She discussed the matter with Angus Belliston

on several occasions.

(R. 260; 262).

She also discussed

financing with Orville Gunther, President of the Bank of
American Fork.

(R. 258).

Although at this time Respondent

was also interested in acquiring the entire farm, which consisted of approximately 450 acres, and sought to determine the
total bank debt on the property, Zions was never able to
furnish this information to her.

(R. 259-61).

On July 14, B75, Mrs. Romrell met with Angus Belliston,
Lawrence Muirbrook, Robert Muirbrook, and Floyd Brown in Mr.
Belliston's office in Salt Lake City.

(R. 264-65).

Since

cions Bank of Ogden had granted the original loan to Muirbrook
Far~s

and was successor trustee under the Trust Deed securing

oam~,

Mr. carl Reed from that bank was also present.

(R. 265;

-l Clll- g "7) •
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During this meeting, Angus Belliston informed Mrs. Romrell
that due to legal technicalities, the real property would have
to be sold separately from the personal property.

(R. 265).

Respondent expressed alarm at this information, since the dairy
could not be operated without both real and personal property
as a unit.

(R, 265-66).

Mr. Belliston also reported that the

bank was going to bid $15,000.00 on the personalty, but since
Mrs. Romrell might have to bid against outside third parties
the bank would consider allowing a credit against the total
purchase price of $190,000.00,

(for the equipment and real

property) if Mrs. Romrell had to bid more than $15,000.00 for
the equipment at the sale.

(Id.)

On July 22, 1975, the bank

agreed to allow a credit of up to $65,000.00 on a bid for the
personalty.

(R. 405-06; 547-48).

on July 23, 1975, the parties met again at Zions Bank in
Salt Lake City, to get final instructions concerning the sale
to take place the next day.

Present were Floyd Brown and his

attorney Lowell Summerhays, Lawrence and carl Muirbrook and
their attorney Marlin Jensen, Howard Sherwood (plaintiff's
CPA), Mr. Belliston, Mr. Reed and Mr. John Allen, attorney for
the bank.

(R. 268-70; 430).

from the bank's attorney,

~r.

In response to a direct question
Brown announced that he had

reached agreement with Mrs. Romrell, that she would bid on
the personalty at the foreclosure sale, and that he was going
to lease the dairy from her.

(R.

269; 353;

377;

432}.

The

representatives of the bank then outl1ned tne 9rocedures to
followed at the sale.

(R.

269;

376-79;

401-)4;

Fl6-D8l.
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D~

During this meeting the group was again infoxmed that the
personal property would be sold in a single lot,

(R. 269; 403).

Either Mr. Belliston or the bank's attorney advised the group
that Zions would open the bidding for the personalty at $15,000.00.
(R. 269; 271; 378; 431).

He further stated that the bank would

credit up to $65,000.00 on the total purchase price of $190,000.00
if it were necessary for Mrs. Romrell to bid that much for the
equipment; but that if she bid more than $65,000.00, she would
still only receive a maximum credit of $65,000.00 on the total
purchase price.

(R. 269; 378).

At the time the meeting con-

cluded, it was fully understood and agreed by everyone that
Mrs. Romrell was going to bid on the personalty and, if successful
in buying the personal propertY, the bank would convey her 160
acres of real property also for a total purchase price of
$190,000.00 for both personal and real property.

(R. 271-72;

407; 475-76; 547-48; 580; 608).
on the morning of the sale, July 25, 1975, Mrs. Romrell met
briefly with Angus Belliston at Zions Bank in Salt Lake City on
her way to the sale in Ogden.

(R. 273-74; 512-13).

She then

met Floyd Brown in Marlin Jensen's office in Ogden to execute
the lease which Mr. Brown, who was an attorney, had agreed to
c:;repare.

(R. 274-75).

Upon reading the proposed lease, however,

)\rs. Rornrell was shocked to discover that Hr. Brown had inserted
an optlon to purchase
:~~

G~e

property from her in the future at

same price she was planning to pay Zions for it.

(!..:!..:._)

"~s~ondent thereupon refused to sign the lease as prepared with

'J[Jlon since that had never been discussed previously.

(~)
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Mrs. Romrell went immediately to the courthouse where the
sale was to be conducted.

(R. 275).

She met with Angus Belliston

approximately 15 minutes before the sale and informed him what

(R. 276).

had happened.

She inquired what her position with

the bank was in view of this turn of events.

(R.

362).

Accord-

inq to both Mrs. Romrell and her brother, Lawrence, Mr. Bellis ton
reaffirmed Zions' commitment to her, stating that the bank would
live up to its agreement to sell the 160 acres to Mrs. Romrell
if she were the successful bidder on the personal property.

(R. 276; 361-63; 379-80; 433-34).

Mr. Belliston further stated

that he believed the agreement of the bank to sell to Mr. Brown
would be void if the bank didn't acquire both the real and persona:
property at the foreclosure sale, since such ownership of both
real and personal property was a precondition of sale to Dairy
capital.

(See Plf's. Ex. 2 at para. 5).

( Id.)

He suggested

they discuss this with Mr. John Allen, Zions' legal
was there to conduct the sale.
statement.

counse~

who

Mr. Allen confirmed Hr. Belliston''

In reliance on these assurances, Respondent

( Id.)

determined to go ahead with her bid on the dairy equipment and
personalty.

369) .

( R.

The sale was held as scheduled, beginning at 12:00 noon on
July 25, 1975.

( R.

John Allen conducted the sale on

275-78) .

behalf of the bank.

( R. 276-77) .

Zions began the bidding for

( R. 277) .

the personalty at $15,000.00.

Floyd Bro;m and El•;a

Romrell then bld J.gainst one another untll Fespondent b1d
$65,000.00 and,

t~ere

successful bidder

~or

bel~c

no

furt~er

the 8ersonal

b1ds,

~ro~erty.

~as

declared

lid.'
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Following sale of the personalty, the real property vas
placed for bid.

(R. 277-78).

The bank was the sole bidder for

the entire 450 acres, having previously agreed to make a joint
bid with Bennett Leasing which held an interest therein.
666-67; 687-89).

(R. 278:

Zions was then declared the successful bidder

for the real property.

(R. 278).

Everything went as had been scheduled and agreed to by
the parties the preceding day, except for the competitive
bidding by Mr. Brown on the personalty.

(R. 278-79).

Following the sale, Mrs. Romrell approached Angus Belliston
to inquire how she was to pay for the property (real and personal).
(R. 279).

After a brief discussion, Mr. Belliston suggested

that she stop by his office on the way home to sign some docu(~)

ments relating to the matter.

Mrs. Romrell met with Mr. Belliston at approximately 5:00
p.m. that afternoon at his office in Salt Lake City.
~r.

(R.

281).

Belliston told her how pleased he was at the way the sale

had gone and that she was "getting that old farm back."

(~)

He further stated that he had discussed financing with Orville

Gunther and wanted her to sign certain documents before she
left.

( R.

232) .

olr. Bellis ton then presented Mrs. Romrell with four trust
je~ds

and two promissory notes which had not been completely
(R. 282-83; 304).

Two trust deeds (original and

3

:u~;)

1:

iUlrino from the bank and the other two trust deeds (original

were to describe the Muirbrook property which she was

<_; " ='-·[-!') '.-Jere to cover her Utah County land which was also
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being pledged as security for the total purchase price of
$190,000.00

(R. 282-83; 303-04).

The two promissory notes

were apparently intended to cover the realty and personalty
separately.

Respondent also signed a financing statement and

security agreement during this meeting.

(R. 306-08).

She had

already furnished Zions with a preliminary title report on her
Utah County property, together with a personal financial statement.

(R. 253; 257-58).

Angus Belliston.

These documents were all retained by

(R. 282-83).

On July 30, 1975, a loan of $190,000.00 to Respondent was
formally approved by the Bank of American Fork.

(R.

295).

Prior

to this time, Orville Gunther, President of the Bank of American
Fork, had discussed the matter with Mr. Belliston who had agreed
that Zions would participate with the Bank of American Fork in
the loan.

(R. 292).

Such participation was required since the

legal loan limit of the Bank of American Fork was insufficient
to carry the entire indebtedness.

( Id.)

When Respondent in-

formed Angus Belliston that her loan had been approved, however,
Mr. Belliston told her for the first time that Zions had no intention of selling her the farm.

(R.

285-86).

Mrs. Romrell immediately reported this conversation to
~lr.

Gunther at the Bank of American Fork who, earlier that daj',

had a~scussed the participation by Zions Bank with the Bank of
American Fork in the total loan of $190,000.00.
95; 629-30).

Upon hearing the report of

~!rs.

(R.

286;

Romrell, i!r.

Gunther immediatel1· called :·!r. 3elllston at :ions Bank.
the first time :-1r. Eelllston tolJ. ~lr.

For

Gunt-her- t:-:a.t =~ens j:..i
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not intend to sell the real property to Mrs. Raarell.

Wbereapon

Mr. Gunther responded that if Zions had not intended to sell
the real property to Mrs. Romrell along with the personalty
there would have been no need to discuss and agree on a participation on the loan between the two banks.

(R. 286, 296).

(This

totally unexpected change of mind occurred after a meeting between

Mr. Belliston, Robert Muirbrook, and Floyd Brown, at which time
Mr. Belliston told Mr. Brown that the bank would not sell the
160 acres to him because Zions had an agreement to sell the
farm to Mrs. Romrell).

(R. 411-12).

On August 1, 1975, Mrs. Romrell went to Zions Bank in Salt
Lake City and tendered $65,000.00 to Mr. Belliston as her down
payment on the purchase price of the dairy farm.
367).

(R. 310-111

Mr. Bel1iston accepted the $65,000.00 on behalf of the

bank, and gave Respondent a bill of sale for the personal property
only.

(R. 310-11).

At that time Mr. Belliston also gave Respon-

dent a file containing two of the trust deeds and one of the
promissory notes she had signed.

(R. 312).

Mr. Belliston

testified at the trial on cross examination that he did not
recall checking to see if all of the documents which Mrs.
Romrell had signed were included in this file.

(R. 634.)

The

bank never gave Mrs. Romrell the titles to vehicles and other
documents relating to the personal property.

(R. 313).

ltrs. Romrell went ahead with a verbal lease of the dairy
cqu1pment to Mr. Brown and Dairy Capital.
"!r.

Br01m

-_,r.tcl as

(R. 319-20; 354).

acreed to pay Respondent the sum of $1560.00 per
rent.

Ha<.vever, only four monthly i.=Jayments were
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actually received.

(R. 320-21).

After Dairy Capital was de-

clared bankrupt, Respondent took over the operation of the
dairy by employing her brother, Lawrence, to manage it on her
behalf.

(R. 321-24).

Following the date of Dairy Capital's petition in bankruptcy,
Mrs. Romre11, acting by and through her brother and employee,
Lawrence Muirbrook,

(who had always operated the dairy farm),

continued to operate the farm, raised cattle thereon, harvested
the crops, used the silage, lived in the farm house, leveled the
ground, repaired corrals, and otherwise enjoyed the possession
of the 160 acres of real property, although the bank has refused to convey title to her.

(R. 321-24; 367; 445-46).

Zions,

on the other hand, has not been in possession of the dairy equipment since August 1, 197 5, and has not actually been in
of the real estate.

possessio~.

(R. 443-45).

Up to the time this action was filed the bank insisted that
all it wanted was to be paid for the amount owing by the Muirbrooks and that the reason it would not convey the 160 acres to
Mrs. Romrell (which would have discharged its agreement to her)
was because it was threatened with litigation by Mr. Brown if
it did so.

However, in October, 1975, Mr. Brown, who was then

leasing the dairy equipment from Mrs. Romrell, told the bank
he was willing to allow the bank to complete its transaction
with Mrs. Romrell and that he would not sue either Zions or
Mrs. Romrell.

(R. 412; 603-05; 636-39).

Zions still refused to deal
property to her.

~ith

In spite of this,

Mrs. Romre!l and conve;

(R. 598-602).
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t~e

Instead, the bank subsequently entered into a contract to
sell the aforesaid real property to Dairy capital Corporation
on or about June 10, 1976, provided it could avoid selling the
same to Mrs. Romrell who by then had filed suit to enforce her
contract.

(R. 530; 598-601).

The bank even went so far as to

agree in its contract with Dairy Capital to defend this suit
to the "court of highest resort".

(R.

601).

After Dairy

capital went into bankruptcy, Zions executed still another
contract to sell the 160 acres to Lester Froerer if its agreement to sell to Mrs. Romrell were declared void.

(R. 465-66;

602) •

Thus, in spite of Mrs. Romrell's continued willingness
and ability to perform her part of the agreement, the bank rAS
consistently refused to honor its contract to sell her the old
Muirbrook family homestead.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO GRANT
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.
A.

Plaintiff Clearly Established the Existence of an

Enforceable Oral Contract to Convey Real Property.
As a general rule, the equitable remedy of specific performance requires proof of the existence of a valid contract
between the parties which is sufficiently definite and certain
to enable the court to command the defendants' performance.
81 C.J.S. Specific Performance §6 (1977) and cases cited therein.
If the contract is oral, its terms must be clear, definite, certain, mutually understood, and fair.
Ballard, 534 P.2d 611

Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v.

(Utah 1975); In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah

2d 40, 269 P.2d 278 (1954).
At trial, Mrs. Romrell testified that she met with Angus
Belliston on April 11, 1975, at which time the terms of the
proposed sale to Brown were discussed in detail.
252-53; 332).

(R. 250;

Those terms included the contracting parties,

the specific subject matter of the contract, i.e., 160 acres
of real property together with dairy equipment located thereon,
the sales price of $190,000.00, the time of performance, together with other terms and conditions of sale.

(Id.)

These

terms had been negotiated by the bank and had been incorporated
in a written lease agreement signed by .:'illgus Belliston.

(See

Agreement of ~la::-c!-1 19, 1975, Plf's. Ex. 2 at Para. S, 8, 9 1
( p. 3 J 2) .
copy thereof was g1ven to ~rs. Romrell.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

Mrs. Romrell further testified that Anqus &elliston informed her on May 2, 1975, that Floyd Brown had agreed to allow
Zions to sell the property to her on the same terma incorporated
in the lease agreement, if Mrs. Romrell would lease the dairy
back to Dairy Capital.
with this proposal.

(R. 255).

(~)

Mrs. Romrell was pleased

Mr. &elliston then suggested that

Zions would assist with financing the purchase for her.

(Id.)

From this point on and until the afternoon of July 30,
1975, the basic terms of the proposed sale never changed.

Both

parties clearly understood who would be buying and selling, what
was to be sold, what was to be paid, and when the transaction
was to occur.

The thrust of the additional negotiations

throughout the months of June and July was to work out the
details of financing the purchase and procedures to be followed
at the sale.
At a meeting held at Zions Bank on July 23, 1975, the
basic terms of sale were again confirmed by the bank, and the
sales procedures were finalized.
406-08).

(R. 269; 376-79; 401-04;

At this time everyone agreed that Mrs. Romrell would

bid on the personal property the next day and would be credited
up to $65,000.00 against the sales price of $190,000.00 for
the realty and personalty as a unit.

(R. 269; 378).

also received this assurance from Floyd Brown.
3~7;

The bank

(R. 269; 353;

432).

On the morning of sale, Elva Romrell informed Angus Belliston
~f

t~e

:Ju~~

failure to sign the written lease with Floyd Brown beof the insertlon of an option to buy in the lease.

( R.
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276).

She specifically asked Belliston what her position with the

bank

vas in light of this development.

(R. 362) .

According

to the uncontroverted testimony of Elva Romrell, Lawrence
Muirbrook, and even Anqus Belliston, Mr. Belliston told Respondent that he believed the bank had no contract with Floyd Brown
if Zions didn't obtain title to both realty and personalty
at the sale.

(R. 276; 361-63; 379-80; 433-34).

But he went

further in that he suggested and actually obtained a legal
opinion from John Allen, Zions' counsel, that the bank had no
obligation to Brown if these two conditions were not met.

(~)

According to both Elva Romrell and Lawrence Muirbrook, r.tr.
Belliston further told her that if she were the successful bidder
on the personal property, Zions would sell her the real property
according to its prior agreement with her.
The bank asserts on appeal that "

(Id.)
there is a complete

lack of evidence in the record which would show that the terms
of the contract were mutually understood by the parties."
(Brief of Appellants at 7).

On this point, the record speaks

for itself:
BY MR. NIELSEN:
Q.
I would like to ask you a few questions this morning,
Mr. Belliston, starting with the morning of July 25, 1975.
That was the day on which the sale was to take place here in
Ogden; was it not?

A.

That's right.

Q.
And if I recall your testimony yesterday, ',vas that
on that morning, and before you left your office in Salt Lake,
Mrs. Romrell dropped into your office there in Salt Lake?

.'\.

That's right.
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Q. And brought you a financial statement from Mr.
Sherwood?

A.

I think so.

Q. And at that time you were aware, or in the conversation
with her, that she was on her way to Ogden at that time to
take part in the sale in accordance with your understanding?
A.

Yes.

Q. And in fact, at that time it was the intent of
the bank to proceed up in Ogden with the sale to Mrs. Romrell
of the personalty and the realty in accordance with the agreement
that had been reached?
A.
That's right.
reached an agreement.

We were under the impression she had

Q. Well, but you had reached an agreement with her too;
hadn't you?
A. We had agreed to sell her the real estate if she
assumed the position or made arrangements with Mr. Brown.
Q.

But you had--

A.
(interposing)
agreement with her.

That's right.

We had made that

Q.
Yes. And it was your intention on the morning of
the 25th to live up to that agreement with her?
A.

Certainly.

Q.
There was nothing indefinite or uncertain about
that agreement about how much property it covered; was there?
A.

No.

Q.
The 160 acres, the water right, the home that Mr.
Robert Muirbrook lived in, and the dairy equipment, the
personal property that was used; and the total price was
Sl90,000.00?

A.

That's right.

Q.

And that there was an amount that could be bid up

:~ 565,000.00 on the personal property which would be applied

}}3lnst the $190,000.00?
n.

That's right.

(R. 608-609).
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Appellants apparently concede that an oral contract between Mrs. Romrell and Zions Bank was entered into sometime prior
to July 25, 1975.

(R. 179; 181; 187).

They argue, however, that

this contract was subject to a condition precedent (never affinu.
tively pleaded) , namely a Romrell lease to Dairy Capital, and tha:
this condition failed on July 25, 1975, the legal effect of whict
was to "dissolve" the contract between the parties.

once the

Romrell contract was "dissolved" and since a "new" oral contract
was not negotiated on the spot, the bank was free to deal with
whomever it pleased.

(R. 179-81)

(Brief of Appellants at 6-7).

The evidence, however, shows that the alleged "pre-condition"
did not fail, but that Mr. Brown attempted to change the lease
to include an option to purchase which Mrs. Romrell refused to
sign.

The lease was thereafter consummated.
If "all bets were off" upon the purported failure of the

so-called condition precedent as defendants claim, why didn't
Angus Belliston simply say so?

Why did he instead tell Mrs.
ba~

Romrell that the Floyd Brown contract was no problem if the
failed to obtain the personalty and then proceed to obtain a
legal opinion from the banks' attorney to confirm this view?

Why did he tell Mrs. Romrell that Zions would go forward with
t~e

its agreement to sell her the real property if she obtained
personal property,

~hich

condition was:

(l)

never part of

Floyd Brown agreement; and (2) expressly made
Romrell agreement on July 23rd?
~ave

unless Zlons 1ntended to

What poss1ble

~ono~

1~s

~art

of

~eason

ac~~e~ent

c~.e

t~e E:~ 3

did

~it

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·~

Respondent submits that the only reasonable view to be
taken of the evidence is that up until July 30, 1975, Zions
fully intended to live up to its previously negotiated agreement
with Elva Romrell.

In so advising her on July 25th, Zions waived

any "condition precedent" which may have existed.
Bobbitt, 119 Utah 465, 229 P.2d 296 (1951).

Ahrendt v.

Furthermore, the

alleged "condition precedent" claimed by the bank was the lease
of the dairy equipment to Brown.

No time limitation was placed

on this condition, and it was fulfilled after the sale when
Mrs. Romrell actually leased the equipment to Brown.
zions' theory that no enforceable oral contract exists,
since an entirely new contract was not negotiated in the 5 or
10 minutes prior to sale, treats those particular events in a
vacuum.

When all of the evidence is viewed in context, it

clearly appears that Respondent did establish the existence
and terms of an oral contract sufficient to permit specific
performance under the law.
B.

Plaintiff Established Sufficient Acts of Part Per-

formance to take the Oral Contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
In the case of Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534
c.2d 611
~'urt

(Utah 1975), relied on by appellants, the Utah Supreme

clearly stated the flexible approach to be applied in

··1:uat1no acts of part performance:
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The doctrine of part performance, in the
State of Utah, has not been reduced to a formula,
as it has in some of our sister states. Thus,
decisions of this court do not stay the hand of
equity in the equitable situations created by
oral contracts for the transfer of an interest
in land, but the statute is preserved and remains
to serve its purpose - prevention of fraud and
injustice.
534 P.2d at 613-14.
The Court then set forth several factors which may be
considered in determining whether part performance exists.

534 P.2d at 614.

These factors were included in the appellants'

requested jury instruction on part performance

(R. 105) which

was given verbatim as the trial court's instruction numberS:
Before an oral contract for the sale of an
interest of land can be enforced in favor of plaintiff,
plaintiff must show by clear, unequivocal and definite
testimony, or other evidence of the same quality,
that the oral contract and its terms were clear,
definite and mutually understood.
In addition,
to establishing these elements showing that the
contract did in fact exist and was understood by both
parties to the contract, plaintiff must show one
of the following:
(a)
that she made improvement[s}
upon the land which were substantial, valuable or
beneficial and for which she could not be compensated
by the payment of money by the seller, (b) that she
took possession of the land with the consent of the
seller [and) that such possession was open, actual and
definite, and exclusive, in that no other persons
were in possession from the time of making the
contract to this date, or (c) that she had delivered
partial or full payment of the purchase price for
the land to the seller and that the seller had
accepted such payment.
If plaintiff failed to show
either that the contract was clear, definite and
mutually understood or that one of the above three
conditions listed in (a), (b) or (c) existed she
is not entitled to a conveyance of the land.
(R. 125).
In reviewing the facts in light of the law contained in ~~:s
instruction, it is apparent that respondent produced substan:la:
evidence from

whic~

the jury could find

t~at

perhaps all tnree of the above conditions

not only one,

~ere

sat1sf1ed.
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b~:

is uncontroverted, for example, that Mrs. Romrell expended funds
to level some ground and repair some corrals that needed work
after July 25, 1975.

(R. 367).

Surely these acts constitute

valuable or beneficial improvements as required by law.

She

also took possession of the dairy equipment and subsequently
leased it to Dairy Capital which operated the dairy on the land
by her permission.

(R. 319-20: 354).

Respondent further testified that after January 1, 1977,
she directly operated the dairy farm by employing Lawrence
Muirbrook to live and work on the real property, and that she
raised cattle, harvested crops, used the silage, and otherwise
enjoyed actual possession of the real property from that date
until now.

(R. 321-24: 445-46).

During this time she was

never given formal notice to vacate by Zions or even informally
asked to leave.

(R. 367).

And even though the bank did

notify Lawrence Muirbrook to vacate the home on or about April
of 1976, it took no steps to enforce the notice.

(R. 442-43).

During all this period of time Zions has not been in possession
of the premises

(R. 443-45).

Thus based on the evidence before

the court, the jury could find that this condition was satisfied
as '"ell.
The third condition set forth in Holmgren and in Appellants'
rec1ues ted ins true tion is valuable consideration or payment for
t:H' property.
~ould
.~_,ss

On this point Mrs. Romrell testified that:

(1)

never have purchased the personalty for $65,000.00

she would thereby also obtain the 160 acres of realty

:~o;

323);

(2)

she ·,.;as told that tr.e $65,000.00 would be
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applied as a credit towards payment of the $190,000.00 purchase
price for the realty and personalty as a unit

(R. 369; 378);

(3) she relied on these representations in placing her bids
(R. 369); (4) she successfully bid for the personalty at the
sale (R. 277); and (5) she tendered payment of the $65,000.00
to Zions which was accepted by the bank.

(R. 310-11; 367).

Surely a jury could reasonably find that Mrs. Romrell was doing
what she claimed and understood she was doing, i.e., making the
down payment on the total package of both realty and personalty.
Furthermore, Mrs. Romrell remains ready, willing, and able to
pay the $125,000.00 balance of the purchase price.

(R. 300-01).

Notwithstanding Respondent's testimony, Appellants argue
that her acts are not exclusively referrable to the

contrac~

since the bill of sale referred only to personal property.
HOwever, this requirement is automatically satisfied in cases
in which the existence of the oral contract is established
by competent evidence independent of the acts of part
performance relied upon to take the contract out of the statute
of frauds.

See e.g., In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278 at 281.

But even apart from this rule, payment of the $65,000.00 could
onl¥ be referrable to the contract for the purchase of the
entire dairy operation, including the realty, since Respondent
test1fied that she never would

~ave

bid for the personalty

in the absence of Z1ons' acreement to sell her the realty.
(R. 319;
clusiv~l~·

323).

'•ll;at act b,·

re~errabie

~o

t~e

~Irs.

Romrell cou:d be more ex-

con~~ac~

t~an

t~ls?
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When the evidence admitted at trial is viewed in its totality
and in context, it is clear that Respondent satisfied at least
one of the conditions of part performance as required by Appellants' own instruction; and the jury so found.

Respondent's

evidence of part performance was, therefore, sufficient to defeat
the statute of frauds defense urged by the bank.
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d

POINT II
THE
A.

TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
REGARDING THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL

The Facts Constituting the Basis of Plaintiff's

Estoppel Claim were Properly Pleaded.
Appellants' major contention regarding estoppel is not
that the court's instructions misstated the law, but rather
that they should not have been given, because estoppel was not
raised in the pleadings or the Pre-trial Order.

In support of

this view, Zions relies on McDonald v. Union Pacific R. R. Co.,
109 Utah 493, 167 P.2d 685 (1946).

In McDonald, a F.E.L.A.

personal injury action, the jury returned a verdict of no cause
of action.

Plaintiff appealed, arguing that by rejecting

certain proffered instructions the court failed to submit
his theory of the case to the jury.

The Utah Supreme Court

carefully analyzed the pleadings and the instructions actually
given by the trial court and concluded that the court followed
"rather closely" the pleadings and the alleged facts.

167 P.2d

at 687.
In the instant case, an analysis of the record will
reveal substantial unchallenged evidence bearing on matters
of estoppel.

As such, the jury could properly base its verdict

on principles of estoppel.

See,

~·

General Insurance Co.

of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 505-06
(Utah 1976); Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos,
310 P. 2d 517, 519-20

6 Utah 2d 226,

(1957); Utal1 R. ClV. P. 15 (b).
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Furthermore, the Pre-trial Order lists the factual allegations in dispute which form the basis of Respondent's estoppel
defense to Zions' assertion of the statute of frauds.

For

example, the Pre-trial Order contains the Plaintiff's allegations
that:
c. Defendants represented that • . • in the
event Zions First National Bank of Ogden acquired title
and possession of said real estate, that defendants
would sell it or cause it to be sold to plaintiff
pursuant to the aforesaid agreement.
d.
Defendants further expressly encouraged
plaintiff to bid on the aforesaid personal property and
agreed, in the event she was the successful bidder, to
credit her with the amount of her bid up to $65,000.00
against the $190,000.00 purchase price for both the
real and personal property.
2. That in reliance upon said agreement and
representations, plaintiff, in fact, did purchase the
personal property at the aforesaid sale on July 25,
1975, for the sum of $65,000.00.
3. That on or about July 25, 1975, and August
1, 1975, plaintiff tendered $125,000.00 to defendants
as the balance of the agreed purchase price, and that
defendants refused to tender and refused to convey
title to the real property to her.

5. That plaintiff has performed all of her obligations under the contract and has been, and now is,
ready, willing and able to pay $125,000.00 to defendants.
6.
That plaintiff has been irreparably damaged
by defendant's refusal to perform under the contract
and that plaintiff should be granted specific performance
of the contract.
7.
That the equipment and personal property so
purchased is of minimal or nominal value without the
real property sought to be recovered herein.

Bank,

[Para. D]
l.
That defendant, Zions First National
~.A., willfully with intent to deceive and defraud
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or recklessly and without regard to the consequences,
induced plaintiff to purchase the aforesaid personal
property by representing that defendants would sell the
aforedescribed real property to plaintiff if she were
to purchase said personalty, and that such representations were false, that defendant knew them to be false
or made them recklessly or without regard to the consequences, that the plaintiff was unaware of their
falsity and relied thereon to her detriment by purchasing said personal property.
(R. 77-78).
The Pre-trial Order also lists as one of the seven
issues of law to be determined at trial, in addition to
those implicit in the issues of fact, the following:
Is plaintiff entitled to specific performance of an
oral agreement to sell real estate?
(R. 81) .
The purpose of the rule, adopted by some courts, that
"[w)here the estoppel is not pleaded, it is inadmissible . .
is to give the defendant fair notice of the case he is called
into court to meet."

Collett v. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231

(1951~

quoting Hemberger v. Alexander, 11 Utah

P.2d 730, 733

363, 40 P. 260, 262 (1895).

It is apparent from the above

excerpts from the Pre-trial order that Appellants were given
fair notice of the case they were called into court to meet
and of the factual allegations of estoppel relied upon by
Respondent.

Additional evidence that Appellants were fully

apprised of the estoppel elements of this case may be found
by reference to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Authorities in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed in 1975 in
which the doctrine of equitable estoppel was discussed in
detail.

(R. 34-39).

Respondent recognizes this Court's statement that

''[~]here

a party seeks to raise an estoppel to a claim set forth in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-26-

::~~

pleadings, facts constituting an estoppel must be pleaded.•
TracY LOan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co., 102 Utah 509,
132 P.2d 388, 391 (1942)

(emphasis added):

~,

~'

Barber •·

Anderson, 73 Utah 357, 274 P. 136, 138 (1929): Bomberger v.
Alexander, 40 P. at 262.

In this case, the factual allegations

listed above from the Pre-trial Order which form the basis of
Respondent's estoppel defense fully comply with the pleading
requirements established by this Court.
In any event, Rule lS(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
eApress or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated
in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Further, Rule 54(c) (1) provides that every judgment "shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings."
B.

Estoppel is a Proper Legal Doctrine Under the Facts

of this Case.
Appellants have further objected to the instructions on the
ground that estoppel is not properly applicable to this case.
Their theory is that "estoppel may not be used against the
statute of frauds in such a manner as to frustrate the basic
policy of the statute."

(Brief of Appellants at 10).

Respondent agrees that estoppel ought not be used in such
a manner as to frustrate the basic policy of the statute of
frauds.
~roper

However, application of this principle is not only
but necessary in this case to prevent the statute from
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being used by Zions to perpetrate a fraud.

See, McKinnon v.

Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1974); Note, 9 Utah
L. Rev. 91 (1964).
The author of the annotation upon which Appellants rely
recognized the appropriateness of using estoppel as a defense
to the statute of frauds in a case such as this:
Basically, the purpose and intent of the statute of
frauds is, of course, to prevent fraud, and it is only
consistent with such a viewpoint that the statute
should not be permitted as a defense where its application would have the effect of perpetrating a fraud.
Thus, courts of equity have often used their powers to
preclude the assertion of the statute where fraud would
result. As already pointed out, the doctrine of estoppel has been closely allied with basic principles of
equity, and it has been widely recognized that when the
factual requirements for application of the doctrine
are present, equitable estoppel may be invoked to
preclude a party to a contract from asserting its
unenforceability by reason that it falls within the
statute of frauds.
Annot., Promissory Estoppel as Basis for Avoidance of Statute of
Frauds, 56 A.L.R. 3d 1037,

§

2 (a] at 1042-43 (1974).

The fact that Utah courts recognize the applicability of
the doctrine of estoppel in cases such as this is amply demonstrated by resort to the very opinions relied upon by Appellants.
In Easton v. Wvcoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332, 335
(1956), this Court refused to apply the principle of promissory
estoppel to a damage action ..,here the damage ·.,as merely
th~

loss of a aood bargain and no money had been expended in

rei1anc~

on the

re~resentat1ons.

but d1d not

cr1tic1z~,

3D F.2d 172

(:oJ.D.

T~e

Easton court

Interstate Co. v. 3c:-Slock

renn. 1028).

::::::.

~:-'.3. t

C3:3~,

-:::-.·=

distinguis~ej
'!ercanti~e

COU!:t

dec

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

c:::.

~3.r2~

that general principles of estoppel prevented the application
of Tennessee's statute of frauds to defeat plaintiff's claim
because "[n]ot only has there been a part-performance •

but

the plaintiff, at the express request of the defendant, and with
the active assistance of defendant, and on its solemn assurance
that the contract would be signed as written, except for formal
changes, has materially changed its position by investing $11,000
in equipment, $2,000 or $3,000 in cleaning and renovating, and
$7,000 in conducting the early stages of the business at a
loss."

30 F.2d at 174-75.

The Easton court distinguished

Bry-Block on the ground that the plaintiff in Bry-Block demonstrated "an unconscionable injury in that plaintiff spent
$15,000 on equipment and improvements upon property which
defendant promised to lease to him," whereas Easton did not
spend any monies on the leased premises, but was damaged solely
because of the loss of a good bargain.

295 P.2d at 334-35.

In the instant case, Zions agreed to sell the dairy farm
comprised of both real and personal property to Mrs. Romrell
for $190,000.00.

One of the terms of the agreement was that

Mrs. Romrell could purchase the personal property at the foreclosure sale and that any amount thus expended up to $65,000.00
~ould

be credited against the total purchase price of $190,000.00.

ars. Romrell bid $65,000.00 and paid this sum to Zions.
t~ose

Under

facts, it is apparent that the bank may not now claim that

~rs.

Romrell did not expend money on the purchase of the dairy

~arm

and was damaged solely by her loss of a good bargain.
Z1ons also cites Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d
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570 (1953).

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court also considered

Bry-Block and similar cases:
The binding thread which runs through these cases,
distinguishing them from the general rule that a mere
promise as to future conduct will not work an estoppel,
is the promise desiqnedly made to influence the conduct
of the promisee, tacitlY encouraging the conduct, and
although the conduct of the promisee constitutes no
actual performance of the oral contract itself, it is
something that "must be done by plaintiff before he
could begin to perform, as was known to the defendants."
260 P.2d at 575-576.
(Emphasis added.)
The court distinguished Ravarino from Bry-Block by noting
that in Ravarino, plaintiff initiated the solicitation to which
defendants merely acquiesced, and that plaintiff's purchase of
a second piece of property under the mistaken belief that he
would also acquire defendant's property was not a step which he
was reasonably required to take before acquiring title.

Id.

In the instant action, however, the real and personal property
were operated as an integral unit; and Mrs. Romrell was required
to purchase the personal property in order to receive a conveyance of the dairy farm.

Those circumstances clearly bring this

case within the Bry-Block rationale and are distinguishable from
the facts in Ravarino.
The Utah Supreme Court has declared that the usual rules
of estoppel require "some conduct of the obligee . . . which
reasonably induces the obligor

to rely thereon and make

some substantial change in his position to his detriment."
Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974).

The same

court has declared equitable estoppel to be applicable where
"conduct by one party . . . leads another party, in rel1ance
thereon, to adopt a course of action result1ng in detr1ment or
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damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his contract.•
carnesecca v. carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah 1975)7 see
Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975).

In

short, estoppel requires conduct by the defendant (such as inducement through a misrepresentation) and an act in reliance on
the inducement which makes it inequitable for the defendant to
avoid the contract.

Brewood v. Cook, 207 F.2d 439, 442 (D.C.

Cir. 1953).
This Court discussed the doctrine of estoppel as it relates
to land sale transactions in Jacobson v. Cox, 155 Utah 102, 202 P.2d
714 (1949).

There this court approached the issue involving the

statute of frauds by noting that "the statute should be used for
the purpose of preventing fraud and not as a shield by which fraud
can be perpetrated."

(202 P.2d, at 720).

The court noted therein

that the plaintiff was familiar with the terms of the distribution
agreement and knew that the parties were relying on its terms to
establish their rights and that he was familiar with the use,
occupancy, and development of the land by defendant's predecessors in interest.

The court also held that, due to his knowledge,

plaintiff could stand in no better position than his mother (from
whom he obtained title) and that "she would be estopped to claim
that she could avoid the legal consequences of the contract because she did not have authority to bind the estate [when she
signed the distribution agreement]."

Id. at 721.

Furthermore,

the court concluded that plaintiff's own conduct estopped him
from taking advantage of the deficiencies in the contract.

"To
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hold otherwise would permit the statute of frauds to be used by
him aa a shield to defeat what appears to be a just and equitable
cause against htm.•

Id. at 722.

Other courts have also applied promissory estoppel under
circumstances similar to the facts of this case.

For example,

in Brewood v. Cook, supra, pursuant to a written contract appelleas purchased eight out of ten lots in a certain parcel from
appellant with a verbal understanding that, should appellant ever
decide to sell the remaining two parcels, appellees could purchase
them according to specified terms.

The court declared that the

appellant could not set up the statute of frauds as a defense to
enforcement of the verbal contract to convey the remaining two
lots because:
With adequate supporting evidence, the [trial] court
found that appellees would not have executed the written contract or accepted conveyance of the eight lots
and improvements, at a cost to them of $49,500, if it
had not been for the inducement of the appellant's
simultaneous agreement to convey subsequently the two
remaining lots. This factual situation brings the case
within the rule that one who thus induces another by a
parol agreement to change his position so materially
that unless the inducing agreement is enforced a fraud
results, is estopped to set up the statute of frauds to
bar such enforcement.
207 F.2d at 441.
In the instant case, Mrs. Rornrell bid at the foreclosure
sale and thereafter paid $65,000.00 in reliance upon Zions' assurance that certain real property would be conveyed to her as part
of a package deal.

(R. 269; 271-72; 378).

Zions knew that she

intended to operate a dairy on the property and that acquis1tion
of both the personal and real property was essent1al to carry
out that purpose.

(R.

265. 66).

Appellants were l1en holders

respect1ng both the real and personal property and

t~e

S65,00J."'
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expended by Mrs. Romrell partially satisfied the landowner
debtor's obligation to the bank.

(R. 630-31).

Mrs. Romrell

suffered "an unconscionable injury" in that she expended
$65,000.00 in acquiring equipment and improvements located

upon land which Zions promised to sell to her but did not.
Furthermore, Zions knew that the land in question had sentimental
value as the homestead upon which Mrs. Romrell and her family
lived when she was a girl and that Respondent would undoubtedly
have attempted to make other financial arrangements for the
acquisition of the property were it not for Zions' assurances and
?r-omises.

(R. 242-53; 316-17).

As in Jacobson v. Cox, supra, Zions has substantially received
the benefit from the contract with Elva Romrell by receiving
S6S,OOO.OO, intended as a partial payment toward the total consideration of $190,000.00, and now improperly attempts to use the
statute of frauds as a shield to escape fulfilling its obligations
thereunder.

Clearly, it was proper to instruct the jury on the

law of estoppel.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY CONCERNING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FORECLOSURE
OF REAL PROPERTY AND FORECLOSURE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Without citing any supporting authority, Appellants
contend that they were entitled to have the jury instructed
on the difference between foreclosure of a loan secured by
personalty under the Uniform Commercial Code, and foreclosure
of a trust deed secured by realty under Utah law governing the
subject.

Their requested instruction merely declares that

foreclosures on personal property are conducted under the UCC
and that trust deed foreclosures on real property are controlled
by procedures prescribed by Utah trust deed foreclosure laws.
Respondent is at a complete loss to understand how the
instruction could have assisted the jury, and how failure to
give the instruction can be deemed to have prejudiced the bank.
Several of the citations to the record relied upon by the bank
don't even bear upon the realty-personalty distinction, but deal
in whole or in part with Mr. Bennett's statement to Mrs. Romrell
that it was too late to cure the default on the realty secured
by the trust deed.

(See R. 243; 316-17; 371).

Furthermore,

the bank presented evidence to support its position why the
realty and personalty were offered in bulk at the sale.
509-lll .

Thu~

(R.

the evidence from both sides was before the

Jury, and an instruction on the technical, legal dist1nction
urged by

~ppellants

would not have been

~elpful.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO SUBMIT DEFENDANTS'
BANKRUPTCY INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY.
Appellants assert that the trial court erred in failing
to instruct the jury that title to property owned by a bankrupt vests in the trustee in bankruptcy and that the property
is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court
from the moment a Petition in Bankruptcy is filed.

(Brief of

Appellants at 14-15).
On page 18 of their brief, Appellants state that "the origina! contract between Defendants and Dairy Capital Corporation
became invalid when one of its terms failed."

That statement

constitutes an admission that Dairy Capital possessed no
interest in the subject property under the March 19, 1975
ment.

(Plf's. Ex. 2.)

A trustee in bankruptcy "takes the contracts

of the debtor subject to their terms and conditions."
v. Texas Mexican Railway Co., 328 U.S. 134, 141 (1946);
Marin v. England, 385

agree-

u.s.

Thompson
see,~·

99, 101 (1966); Johnson v. Kurn, 95

F.2d 629, 633 (8th Cir. 1938); In re Penn Central Transportation

Co., 391 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
The second contract with Dairy Capital was executed after
Z1ons agreed to sell the family homestead to Elva Romrell and
after this action was filed, and was specifically conditioned on
~1ons'

success in this action.

(Defs.' Ex. 2 at para. 16).

\ "trustee takes no title to property which did not belong to
:1e bankrupt at the
- '1 ''2

Jacobv,

time when the bankruptcy petition was filed."

138 F.2d 42,

45 (3d Cir. 1943); see, e.g., San Diego
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Wholesale Credit Men's Ass'n. v. Garner, 325 F.2d 862 (9th Cir.
1963): In re Dayton Coal

&

Iron Co., 291 F.390 (E.D. Tenn. 1922). ,

If Respondent succeeds in this action, then she was entitled to
the possession and ownership of the Muirbrook farm long before
Zions agreed to sell it to Dairy Capital.

When Zions and Dairy

capital executed their contract, Zions had nothing to convey.
The above facts are recognized by both the trustee for Dairy
Capital corporation in the bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Court,
and were briefly explained to the trial court out of the presence '
of the jury.

(See comments of F. Burton Howard, R. 696).

The

action which is the subject of this appeal was automatically
stayed when the petition in bankruptcy was filed on January 20,
1977.

On March 17, 1978, Mrs. Romrell filed a complaint for

relief from the stay with the

B~nkruptcy

Court alleging, in part,

as follows:
. Plaintiff submits .
. that the
4.
Trustee's interest, if any, is contingent upon
Zions First National Bank, N.A., or Zions First
National Bank of Ogden prevailing in the previously
filed action in Weber County.
Plaintiff suggests
that if she should prevail in such action, neither
of the Zions Bank corporations nor the Trustee
would have any interest in the property and that
the only manner to determine the extent of the
Trustee's interest is to allow the litigation to
proceed in Weber County.
The Trustee's answer to the above referenced complaint, filed
April 3, 1978, admitted all particulars of the complaint and
joined in requesting that Mrs. Romrell be allowed to proceed
with the state court action.
entry for the hearing on
reads as

t~e

The Bankruptcy Court's m1nute
compiainc

~eld

~a·

5, 1973,

~allows:
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Stay order granted for Mr. Howard [plaintiff's
counsel) to go ahead with Weber County suit. If
Mrs. Romrell wins, Trustee would have no interest.
If she loses, Trustee would have some claim. Order
entered vacating stay.
The court also properly declined to give the instruction
because no issues regarding the Dairy Capital bankruptcy proceedings were before the jury.

Defense counsel attempted to

introduce evidence regarding those proceedings in the trial for
the first time at the close of Defendants' case when he offered
Defendants' Exhibits No. 4 and 5, copies of two documents from
the Dairy Capital bankruptcy case.

Plaintiffs' counsel objected

on grounds of materiality and relevancy.

Following argument,

the court sustained the objection declaring:
. I'm not going to confuse this action with your
bankruptcy court.
If you have any further questions
in regard to possession of any of the, why, why go
ahead and do it through your evidentiary thing.
I
will not admit it.
I think it would tend to more
confuse than anything.
I am not going to get that
complicated.
(R.698).
Defense counsel responded to the opportunity to present additional
evidence regarding possession by declaring:

"Well, we still rest."

(~)

Appellants do not now contend that the court erred by refusing the admission of the preferred exhibits, but their sole
contention is that the court committed reversible error by fail1ng to give the requested instruction.
~o

Having properly refused

allow the introduction of the above-referenced exhibits and

d~fense

counsel having declined the opportunity to present other

-··1dence on the subject, the court properly refused the DefeniJ~'s'

1equested instruction.

The instruction was pure sur-
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plusage with no foundation in properly admitted evidence.
would have merely confused the jury.

It

Consequently the trial court

acted properly in declining to instruct the jury concerning bankruptcy.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO SUBMIT DEPENDANTS'
PROPOSED SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY, SINCE
THEY WOULD HAVE LIMITED THE JURY'S ABILITY TO CONSIDER
EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF.
The special interrogatories which Appellants sought to have
submitted to the jury were entirely self-serving and properly
refused by the court.

The impropriety of the requested interroga-

tories is evident from the wording of the proposed first interrogatory:
Did defendants, on or about July 25, 1975, enter
into an oral contract with plaintiff whereby they
agreed to sell to her the 160 acres of land which
is the subject of this case?
(R. 112).
Through this interrogatory, Zions attempted to prevent the
jury from considering the negotiations and transactions in evidence
which occurred

over a period of several months.

It also assumes

that only a "new" agreement made on that day could be enforceable.
The remaining interrogatories were equally inappropriate because,
in addition to being self-serving, they were totally dependent
upon the jury's answer to the first interrogatory.
The Utah Supreme Court made the following comment in
Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 264, 267 (1957):
\men a general verdict will best settle the issues,
it should be used. When specific issues cannot be
reached by a general verdict, the trial court
should take advantage of special verdicts or special
interrogatories.
The wording of the preceding dictum makes it clear that the
:~iQl

court is to exercise its discretion in determining when a

>'r.·cral verdict will best settle the issues.
~i-nc~d

That fact is clearly

by the court's use of the word "should" rather than "shall"
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or •must• in describing when a general verdict should be used.
Furthermore, Rule 49(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a trial court "may," not "must" or "shall," submit
written interrogatories to the jury along with appropriate verdict
forms.

An annotation in which Baker is cited declares:
The fundamental principle underlying the
submission of special interrogatories in connection
with a general verdict, as provided by Federal Rule
49(b) and state counterparts, is that such matters
as whether interrogatories shall be submitted, how
many there shall be, how shall they be phrased,
etc., are within the discretion of the trial judge,
whose rulings in connection therewith will not be
disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
This principle is recognized in most if not all the
cases discussed herein.
Annot., Submission of Special Interrogatories in Connection with
General Verdict under Federal Rule 49(8), and State Counterparts,
6 A.L.R. 3d 438, §3 at 446-47

(1966).

The special interrogatories in the instant case were selfserving and designed to limit the jury's ability to consider
evidence favorable to the Plaintiff.

Consequently, the trial

court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to submit
the interrogatories and in concluding that the issues could
properly be reached by a general verdict.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, BECAUSE THERE IS
BOTH A REASONABLE BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE AND
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT.
Appellants contend that they are entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict because "the processes of justice have
been so completely thwarted or distorted • • • that in fairness
and good conscience the judgment should not stand" and because
the jury speculated in reaching its verdict.
lants at 17-18).

(Brief of Appel-

As has been demonstrated in the preceding sec-

tions of this brief, the processes of justice have neither been
thwnrted nor distorted; and the judgment should be affirmed.
As the finders of fact in this matter, it was within the
jury's province to accept Respondent's evidence and to reject
conflicting evidence presented by Appellants:
Short of capriciously or arbitrarily rejecting
credible evidence when there is no sound reason
for doing so, it is the exclusive province of
the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses.
Where there is any reasonable basis for refusing
to believe a witness they are not necessarily
obliged to accept his testimony . . . .
. . . the granting of a judgment n. o. v. [completely overrides] the jury and their verdict and
thus effectively deprives the party of his right
to a jury trial.
Therefore, this can properly be
done only when under the evidence and the law
there is no reasonable basis in the evidence, or
lack of it, to justify the verdict given.
Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P.2d 77, 79 (1964)
(emphasis added).
In Winters v. W.S. Hatch Co., Inc., 546 P.2d 603, 605
'~ta~

1976), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that:
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
presents solely a question of law to be determined
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and that:
the trial court must view the evidence most
favorably to the party against whom the motion is
made.
If, after having made that review, the trial court concludes
that there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could
base its verdict, the jury verdict must be allowed to stand.

Id.

The Koer case cited by Appellants for the proposition that
a jury may not find facts from speculation and conjecture was a
slip and fall personal injury action, and the decision concerned
the plaintiff's failure to present any substantial evidence to
show how the grape on which she slipped and fell came to be
placed in her path.

This decision is clearly distinguishable

from the instant case, where substantial evidence of the existence and terms of a contract to sell real property and of
estoppel and part-performance was presented at trial.

See,

Koer v. Hayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P. 2d 566

( 1967)

A jury is not absolutely precluded from using inferences
in arriving at a verdict, but there must be a sound basis in
the evidence for the inference relied upon by the jury in reaching its verdict.

Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 15 Utah 2d

113, 388 P.2d 409, 410

(1964).

As in the instant case:

Whenever there is a genuine dispute as to issues
of fact upon \oJhich the parties' rights depend,
they are entitled to have them submitted to and
settled by a JUr~·.
\oJhen the ;:>arties have had a
full and fair opportunity to present their cause,
and the Jury has rendered its verdict, it should
not be 1nterfered with unless there appears some
compellina reason why justice demands that l t be
done.
388 P.2d at 412.
~o

such compellins

~eason

~x1s~s

1~

~:~~~

2ase,

=ions'

"l·- -__ -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, SINCE THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
In considering the circumstances under which a trial court
should grant a motion for new trial, the opinions constantly
use phrases such as "miscarriage of justice," "no rational basis,"
"misconception of proven facts," "misapplication or disregard
of the law," "passion and prejudice."

Hyland v. St. Mark's Hospi-

tal, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736, 738 (1967); EFCO Distribution,
Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615, 617-18 (1966);
Holland v. Brown, supra, at 79; Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 9521 954 (1960).
Although a trial court has discretion in considering a
motion for new trial, the above language makes it clear that
the standard to be applied is very stringent and "unless some
such error or impropriety as [stated above) is clearly shown,
the verdict of the jury should stand."

v. Perrin, supra at 617.

EFCO Distribution, Inc.

The Court, in EFCO, further declared

that:
when the parties have had the opportunity of presenting the evidence and arguments concerning their
dispute to the jury, the judgment of the jury should
be allowed to swing through a wide arc within the
limits of how reasonable minds might see the situation; and the court should not upset a verdict merely
because it may disagree.
If it did so, the right of
trial by jury would be effectively abrogated and the
trial may as well be to the court in the first place.
The court itself must find and follow a rational
policy in the middle ground between permitting a jury
to be completely arbitrary and unjust where there is
~o reasonable basis in fact or law for its action on
the one hand, and on the other, of himself being
2rb1trary by null1fying the jury's judgment merely be~aus,o> it is not l!' accord with his own.
412 P. 2d at 618.
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For this reason, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized
that "in doubtful cases the doubts are resolved in favor of
submitting the case to the jury; and in favor of supporting the
verdict when rendered."
P.2d at 956,

Lund v. Phillips Petroleum co., 351

Similarly, a court should "interfere with the

verdict only when it is so outside the limits of reason that it
must be said that there is no substantial evidence to support
it.•

Id.

And where the evidence is in conflict, this Court

presumes that the jury believed the evidence which supports its
verdict and reviews the record in that light.

Lee v. Howes,

548 P.2d 619, 620 (Utah 1976); Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co.
v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900

(Utah 1975).

As discussed above, substantial, competent evidence sufficient to uphold the verdict and judgment was submitted at the
trial of the instant case.

Appellants had a full and fair

opportunity to present their case, and there is no basis for
granting a new trial.
CONCLUSIO~

Upon consideration of the facts in the light most favorable
to the JUry verdict as required on appeal, Gilhespie v. DeJong,
520 P.2d 878 (Utah 1974), it is clear that i-<espondent establisheC:
the existence and terms of an oral contract to convey real
property by substantial, competent evidence.
established sufficient facts from

~hich

Respondent further

the jury reasonably

found part-performance of the aareement on her part and,or an
estoppel to deny the aareernent

~n

the banks' part.
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Although the banks deny any confirmation of the oral
contract by Angus Belliston at the foreclosure sale on July
25, 1975, it was within the exclusive province of the jury to
decide whom to believe.

This court should not substitute its

judgment for that of the jury which had the opportunity to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses during a trial lasting
four days.

Since Appellants have failed to establish any com-

pelling reason for reversal, or new trial, the judgment on the
verdict should be affirmed.
DATED this

'lS ,,. day of

~ ~ ~ \\

I

1979.

Respectfully Submitted,
NIELSEN, HENRIOD 1 GOTTFREDSON & PECK

By
Arthur H. N~elsen
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY & OWENS

By

Jet \\~OA~G)Jj_Q

G. Richard H~ll
1000 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the Brief of Respondent

were delivered to John H. Allen, CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER,
Attorneys for Appellants, BOO Kennecott Building, Salt Lake
f\' rtl
.
City, Utah, 84133, this -~--b-day of AprLl,
1979.
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